Dr. Brian B Crisher

Can district interests mitigate partisan differences over climate policy? While debates over climate policy are highly partisan, local economic and national defense interests may create cross-cutting pressures that reduce polarization. Here, we analyze whether district characteristics mitigate partisan differences on climate change, particularly public opinion and exposure of military installations to weather-related damage. Using two studies—one using a large language model to measure the positions lawmakers take in congressional email newsletters and another employing a survey experiment testing framing effects—we assess whether national defense and economic concerns mitigate partisan divisions. Our findings suggest that Republicans representing districts where severe weather events threaten local military infrastructure express more support for " pro-climate " policy than other Republicans, and that Democrats representing environmentally conservative districts express less support. However, our experiment found no evidence that the issue frame influences voters' opinions.

What accounts for the growth of naval power in Asia, and are we witnessing a new naval arms race? Through a unique quantitative assessment of naval development in Asia, I show that economic and geostrategic factors are driving naval development in the region. Additionally, I examine the growth of naval might in China, Japan, India, and South Korea, and find evidence of a potential naval arms race in Asia. The article's findings point to the importance of testing for regional variation in naval development and using specific weapons systems to test for evidence of an arms race.

Why do some wars end with an absolute outcome, with state death or regime change? I argue that we are more likely to see absolute outcomes when we have territorial disputes with the potential for credible commitment problems and asymmetric disputants. In the absence of credible commitment problems, disputes are less likely to recur, and states are unlikely to seek to absorb the opponent state or remove its government. Among more symmetric disputants, states cannot impose an absolute outcome, and we are more likely to see recurrent disputes in the face of credible commitment problems. Only in very asymmetric dyads are we likely to have both the required willingness and opportunity to impose absolute outcomes to attempt to solve a credible commitment problem over territorial conflict.

Extant research has not produced consistent findings on the relationship between domestic political problems and the use of force abroad. We argue that this ambiguity results from incomplete theorizing and flawed empirical tests. We advance the understanding of diversionary uses of force by highlighting the political bias that domestic problems create for a leader and how this political bias interacts with the power relationship between diverters and potential targets. This conceptual discussion clarifies the political incentives each actor has to engage in military conflict and leads to a novel hypothesis. For example, domestic problems increase the probability that a weak state will attack a strong state, but domestic problems will have little effect on changing the probability of conflict between strong and weak. Empirical tests of the hypotheses for the period 1946–2000 are consistent with the argument.

Power is a crucial concept for international relations scholars. Of particular importance for those interested in understanding foreign policy is knowing how power manifests as national capabilities. Understanding the relationship between power and capabilities allows for comparison and contrast of the various foreign policy tools leaders have at their disposal as they attempt to achieve their goals. Despite the importance of power, scholars still debate the best means for conceptualizing and operationalizing the concept. The all-encompassing nature of power makes it difficult to focus on a single characteristic. This article focuses on three main aspects of power: military, economic, and soft power. Each section gives an overview into the current state of research into the various aspects of power. The discussion on military power emphasizes operationalizing military might and issues with innovation. The section on economics focuses on economics as a source of power and a tool for coercion. Finally, the last section focuses on noncoercive aspects of power, better known as soft power. The article ends with some suggestions for future research.

Does an increase in naval power increase the likelihood of interstate disputes? While volumes have been written on the importance of naval power, we are left with little more than intuition and anecdotal evidence to provide potential answers to this question. Endogeneity issues in particular make it difficult to untangle the links between developing naval power and interstate conflict. Here I present a new instrument for naval power. Utilizing a new dataset of naval power and employing an instrumental variable analysis, I present one of the first large cross-national studies showing a significant link between naval power and a specific type of interstate conflict - non-contiguous disputes. The findings have implications for the future actions of states whose naval strength is growing.

EXCERPT - Naval power is a crucial element of state power, yet existing naval datasets are limited to a small number of states and ship types. Here we present 147 years of naval data on all the world’s navies from 1865 to 2011. This country-year dataset, which we will publish in a forthcoming article in International Interactions, focuses on warships with ship-based weapons capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples. After identifying a country’s active naval forces, we create a measure of naval power based on the aggregate tonnage of the active ships. Additionally, we create count variables for ship types such as aircraft carriers or battleships. This summary paper introduces the country-year data, describes variables of interests and suggests potential questions of interest scholars could explore using the naval power dataset.

Naval power is a crucial element of state power, yet existing naval data sets are limited to a small number of states and ship types. Here we present 147 years of naval data on all the world's navies from 1865 to 2011. This country-year data set focuses on warships with ship-based weapons capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples. After identifying a country's active naval forces, we create a measure of naval power based on the aggregate tonnage of the active ships. Additionally, we create count variables for ship types such as aircraft carriers or battleships. This article introduces the country-year data, describes variables of interests for use in country-year, dyadic, or systemic studies, and suggests potential questions of interest scholars could explore using the naval power data set.

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty-in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict-determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent's capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state's willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory's implications.

In the aftermath of September 11th, the war against Afghanistan, and the recent war in Iraq, just war theory has become a focal point of discussion in
international affairs. Due to the fact that the Bush administration justified the Iraqi war on preemptive principles, preemptive wars have become an even greater focus. As just war theory enters the twenty-first century and the new war on terrorism unfolds, two questions arise: Are the jus ad bellum principles of just war theory flexible enough to be applicable to a new international system where Cold War strategies are no longer pertinent? If so, should there be an alteration to the limited exception of preemptive selfdefense, which would justify the Bush administration’s use of anticipatory self-defense as set forth in the National Security Strategy of 2002?
In order to answer these questions, first I will undertake a survey of the origin and development of just war theory. Then, an examination of the distinction between preemptive and preventive self-defense will follow. To better understand the distinction, current just war principles will be applied to empirical cases which include; World War I, the Six-Day War, the war in Afghanistan, and the second Iraqi War. Following the empirical cases is an analysis of the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, and its relationship to just war theory. Lastly, a brief examination of how the international community alters international law is conducted to determine the viability of changes to jus ad bellum laws.
After all analysis is complete, the answers to the previous two questions will become apparent. History shows that just war theory is very flexible and indeed owes its survival to an ability to adapt to new international systems. Therefore, while the theory can adjust to the postSeptember 11th world, there is a limit to its flexibility. Because of this, President Bush’s concept of anticipatory self-defense is, and will continue to be, unjust according to international law.