Metrics
22 Record Views
Journal article
Domestic Political Problems and the Uneven Contenders Paradox
Foreign policy analysis, Vol.13(4), pp.876-893
10/2017
Web of Science ID: WOS:000416815000006
Abstract
Extant research has not produced consistent findings on the relationship between domestic political problems and the use of force abroad. We argue that this ambiguity results from incomplete theorizing and flawed empirical tests. We advance the understanding of diversionary uses of force by highlighting the political bias that domestic problems create for a leader and how this political bias interacts with the power relationship between diverters and potential targets. This conceptual discussion clarifies the political incentives each actor has to engage in military conflict and leads to a novel hypothesis. For example, domestic problems increase the probability that a weak state will attack a strong state, but domestic problems will have little effect on changing the probability of conflict between strong and weak. Empirical tests of the hypotheses for the period 1946–2000 are consistent with the argument.
Related links
Details
- Title
- Domestic Political Problems and the Uneven Contenders Paradox
- Publication Details
- Foreign policy analysis, Vol.13(4), pp.876-893
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Copyright
- © The Author (2016).
- Identifiers
- WOS:000416815000006; 99380570996006600
- Academic Unit
- College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities; Reubin O'D. Askew Department of Government
- Language
- English