Journal article
Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State Constitutions
State politics & policy quarterly, Vol.16(3), pp.267-289
09/2016
Web of Science ID: WOS:000380925600001
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Abstract
Why are some institutions quickly replaced while others endure for more than a century? Majority cycling over institutions is theoretically unavoidable, but politics provides few opportunities to study it empirically. Using data on state constitutional characteristics and legislative composition from 1834 to 2012, this article advances the theory that institutions are more likely to be endogenously replaced when the society of actors differs from the time of enactment, and that institutional characteristics can exacerbate or mitigate these risks. Results show that political change interacts with institutional particularism to preserve or undermine state constitutions. More particularistic constitutions have shorter life spans because they are more vulnerable to changes in the political environment.
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Details
- Title
- Why Are Some Institutions Replaced while Others Persist? Evidence from State Constitutions
- Publication Details
- State politics & policy quarterly, Vol.16(3), pp.267-289
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Sage
- Number of pages
- 23
- Copyright
- © The Author(s) 2015
- Identifiers
- WOS:000380925600001; 99381805400906600
- Academic Unit
- Reubin O'D. Askew Department of Government ; College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities
- Language
- English