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Journal article
The unintended consequences of high expectations and pressure on new CEOs
Journal of business finance & accounting, Vol.40(3 & 4), pp.501-526
40
2013
Web of Science ID: WOS:000318236100008
Abstract
We provide empirical tests of a general version of Jensen’s (2003) theory that greater scrutiny could lead to executive abuses. Our results show that new CEOs under higher expectations or pressure are more likely to report meeting analyst forecasts; however, this apparent superior performance dissipates after excluding firms having characteristics synonymous with earnings manipulation. We find evidence that new CEOs under greater pressure are considerably more likely to engage in manipulation while the link between expectations and manipulation is much weaker. The results are strongest for new CEOs whose firms report meeting forecasts and do not walk down earnings estimates.
Details
- Title
- The unintended consequences of high expectations and pressure on new CEOs
- Publication Details
- Journal of business finance & accounting, Vol.40(3 & 4), pp.501-526
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.; United Kingdom
- Series
- 40
- Copyright
- ©2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- Identifiers
- WOS:000318236100008; 99380090644406600
- Academic Unit
- Accounting and Finance; Lewis Bear Jr. College of Business
- Language
- English