Journal article
The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism
Philosophical psychology, Vol.37(8), pp.2244-2261
11/16/2024
Web of Science ID: WOS:000864126500001
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Abstract
Epiphenomenalism is the thesis that though physical events may cause mental events, those mental events never cause physical events. In this paper, I will be concerned with the claim that our thoughts, intentions, and awareness play no causal role in producing actions. Though epiphenomenalism has been defended with a priori philosophical arguments, the majority of the support that it has gained in recent years has come from advances in neuroscience. At the center of these experiments is the Libet paradigm that aims to show that our actions are initiated by unconscious brain processes prior to our awareness of the intention or decision to perform the corresponding actions. It has been widely suggested that these studies support the view that consciousness is epiphenomenal, and if Libet-style experiments support this conclusion, the results have direct implications for free will. I argue by way of a dilemma that any study that relies on reports of subjects' awareness in its methodology cannot be used to support epiphenomenalism because the experimenters would have to rule out the possibility that consciousness plays a causal role in order to do so.
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Details
- Title
- The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism
- Publication Details
- Philosophical psychology, Vol.37(8), pp.2244-2261
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Number of pages
- 18
- Copyright
- © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
- Identifiers
- WOS:000864126500001; 99381473578806600
- Academic Unit
- History and Philosophy; College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities
- Language
- English