campaign fundraising committee assignment Government Studies Political Parties Political Science United States
In the article, we argue that closer competition for control of the House of Representatives and increases in the cost of campaigns have elevated the importance of campaign fundraising in the committee assignment process. When the majority party holds a narrow margin, we expect them to give freshmen and electorally marginal lawmakers abnormally lucrative committee assignments. We test this argument using both a novel measure of committee fundraising quality and data on committee assignments, campaign contributions, and election results from 1985 to 2012. We find support for our expectation regarding freshmen, but not marginal lawmakers. Our findings are consistent with the view that party leaders are using committee assignments to increase their party's total fundraising when control of the chamber is close, possibly at the expense of other goals. We show how recent political trends are changing the dynamics of the committee assignment process, with implications for both the institution's function and lawmaker behavior.