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Journal article
Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads
International interactions, Vol.40(2), pp.246-269
03/15/2014
Web of Science ID: WOS:000333951500005
Abstract
Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty-in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict-determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent's capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state's willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory's implications.
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Details
- Title
- Inequality Amid Equality
- Publication Details
- International interactions, Vol.40(2), pp.246-269
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Copyright
- © Taylor & Francis 2014
- Identifiers
- WOS:000333951500005; 99380571882706600
- Academic Unit
- College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities; Reubin O'D. Askew Department of Government
- Language
- English