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Journal article
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence, Vol.68(1), pp.135-160
07/2013
Web of Science ID: WOS:000328831600006
Abstract
We investigate the computational complexity of finding optimal bribery schemes in voting domains where the candidate set is the Cartesian product of a set of variables and voters use CP-nets, an expressive and compact way to represent preferences. To do this, we generalize the traditional bribery problem to take into account several issues over which agents vote, and their inter-dependencies. We consider five voting rules, three kinds of bribery actions, and five cost schemes. For most of the combinations of these parameters, we find that bribery in this setting is computationally easy.
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Details
- Title
- Bribery in voting with CP-nets
- Publication Details
- Annals of mathematics and artificial intelligence, Vol.68(1), pp.135-160
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- Number of pages
- 26
- Grant note
- IIS-1107011; CCF-1049360 / National Science Foundation; National Science Foundation (NSF) 20089M932N / MIUR PRIN; Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR); Research Projects of National Relevance (PRIN) Australian Government through the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy; Australian Government University of Padova University of Kentucky Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence program; Australian Research Council
- Copyright
- © 2013, Springer Science Business Media Dordrecht
- Identifiers
- WOS:000328831600006; 99380590596906600
- Academic Unit
- Hal Marcus College of Science and Engineering ; Intelligent Systems and Robotics; Institute for Human and Machine Cognition
- Language
- English