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Journal article
Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences
Journal of logic and computation, Vol.19(3), pp.475-502
06/2009
Web of Science ID: WOS:000266353300004
Abstract
Preferences are not always expressible via complete inear orders: sometimes it is more natural to allow for the presence of incomparable outcomes. This may hold both in the agents preference ordering and in the social order. In this article, we consider this scenario and study what properties it may have. In particular, we show that, despite the added expressivity and ability to resolve conflicts provided by incomparability, classical impossibility results (such as Arrows theorem, MullerSatterthwaites theorem and GibbardSatterthwaites theorem) still hold. We also prove some possibility results, generalizing Sens theorem for majority voting. To prove these results, we define new notions of unanimity, monotonicity, dictator, triple-wise value-restriction and strategy-proofness, which are suitable and natural generalizations of the classical ones for complete orders.
Details
- Title
- Aggregating Partially Ordered Preferences
- Publication Details
- Journal of logic and computation, Vol.19(3), pp.475-502
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Number of pages
- 28
- Copyright
- © The Author, 2008.
- Identifiers
- WOS:000266353300004; 99380590597206600
- Academic Unit
- Hal Marcus College of Science and Engineering ; Intelligent Systems and Robotics; Institute for Human and Machine Cognition
- Language
- English