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Journal article
Agency incompatibilism, luck, and intelligibility
Inquiry (Oslo), pp.1-24
11/03/2024
Web of Science ID: WOS:001347171500001
Abstract
The problem of luck is one of the most formidable obstacles currently facing libertarian theories of free will. Some have argued that there is no problem, while others have argued that the problem is not a unique one for libertarians. Still others acknowledge the problem and aim to address it with their preferred libertarian theory. Steward (2012a) takes the latter strategy with her agency incompatibilism. She develops a version of the problem of present luck and argues that agents who possess a two-way power, which is a power to either perform some action or refrain from performing it, avoid the problem. If she is successful this would be a big point in favor of agency incompatibilism, and it could indicate a successful strategy for others to follow. I argue that just as Steward insists that we ought to move from more robust abilities to the ability to refrain, the proponent of the problem of luck can do the same, and, once doing so, they can posit a very similar luck objection to refraining. Moreover, I suggest that the ability to settle that Steward defends is not robust enough to ground moral responsibility.
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Details
- Title
- Agency incompatibilism, luck, and intelligibility
- Publication Details
- Inquiry (Oslo), pp.1-24
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- Number of pages
- 24
- Copyright
- © 2024 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
- Identifiers
- WOS:001347171500001; 99381473578706600
- Academic Unit
- History and Philosophy; College of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities
- Language
- English