When a group of agents needs to take a collective decision, e.g., to coordinate their action, a voting rule can be used to aggregate their individual preferences into a collective choice. In similar situations agents can act strategically and manipulate the election by misrepresenting their preferences and change the outcome in their favor. While manipulation is traditionally considered a bad behavior to be avoided, in this paper we show that this form of strategic reasoning can yield beneficial results in the setting of iterative voting. We study sequences of elections where at each step an individual is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove the convergence of this process for several combinations of voting rules and manipulation moves, and we present experiments that show that the winner after iteration is often a better candidate than the initial one. We also analyze axiomatic and computational properties of iterated voting rules, comparing them to the properties of the one-step version of the same voting rules.
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Details
Title
Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting
Publication Details
Proceedings of ADT, pp.181-192
Resource Type
Conference proceeding
Conference
International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 3rd (Bruxelles, Belgium, 11/13/2013–11/15/2013)