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Fiscal policy, economic conditions, and terms in office: Simulating presidential election outcomes
Conference paper   Open access

Fiscal policy, economic conditions, and terms in office: Simulating presidential election outcomes

Alfred G. Cuzán, Richard J. Heggen and Charles M. Bundrick
International Society for Systems Sciences 44th Conference, July 20-22, 2000 (Toronto, Canada, 07/20/2000–07/22/2000)
2000

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Abstract

This paper reports on a set of simulations of a fiscal model of American presidential elections previously developed by the authors in which, independently of economic conditions, fiscal expansion and consecutive terms in office combine to reduce the percent of the two-party vote going to the incumbents, thus contributing to their defeat. The model adequately fits the data on all thirty elections held since 1880. The purpose of the simulations is to explore important attributes of the model not readily apparent in the historical data. The model views voters as averse but incumbents as favorably inclined to fiscal expansion. Theoretically, the confluence of these contrary currents should give rise to a fiscal-electoral cycle. To see if this is the case, 1,000 elections are simulated. Two feedback loops are observed, the joint operation of which results in the expected fiscal-electoral cycle. The cycle places a natural limit on the number of consecutive terms a party will remain in control of the White House. These findings suggest crucial behavioral differences between democracies and dictatorships.
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